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The urban/rural divide is pervasive in policy-making in Nebraska. In this nonpartisan 
state, coalitions based on spatial identity or whether the legislator is urban or rural seem 
to have greater weight than party especially in the creation of economic development 
policy. Often, economic development policies include locational considerations which 
give areas such as rural areas and economically distressed areas greater weight when 
distributing program funds. In my study, I investigate whether constituency or party has a 
greater impact on the legislative behavior of Nebraska state legislators when voting on 
economic development and environmental legislation. I expect that constituency would 
have a greater impact on the voting of rural legislators due to their shared rural spatial 
identity between rural legislators and their constituents. I hypothesize that influence of 
constituency will be greater because party ties in Nebraska are weak due to the expected 
non-partisan nature of the Nebraska Unicameral. To test the impact of party and 
constituency, I conduct an analysis of final reading roll call votes from the 2011-2012 
legislative session. I find that neither party nor constituency have much impact on the 
voting behavior of legislators. Further study will be needed to understand the factors that 
are organizing voting in the Unicameral. Lack of party or spatial ties can pose serious 
implications for economic development planning. 
Key Words:  Rural, Economic Development, Political Culture, State Legislation,  
   Environmental Policy 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 In Nebraska, one of the most salient policy problems which has many 
implications from an economic development planning perspective is rural sustainability. 
This multifaceted issue highlights the need for policies that are sensitive to rural areas. 
Concerning rural sustainability, “Brain Drain” or “human capital flight” is a serious 
threat facing many rural communities.
1
 The flight of graduating students out of the rural 
areas poses many serious economic problems. First, the amount of investment in our 
state’s public education system is not returned. Second, when students leave and fail to 
return, there are fewer people left to support and run existing businesses. Third, new 
business will be less likely to locate in the rural areas and in the state as a whole because 
of the lack of skilled workers.
2
 Because of these potential issues, alleviating human 
capital flight has become a top priority for Nebraska’s Department of Economic 
Development (DED).  
 In 2009-2010, in response to these concerns, the Nebraska Department of 
Economic Development in conjunction with the Nebraska Department of Labor 
sponsored the Growing Jobs, Industries, and Talent, A Competitive Advantage 
Assessment and Strategy for Nebraska, also known as “The Battelle Study,” by the 
Battelle Technology Partnership Practice. The “Battelle Study” evaluated the 
Department’s overall economic development strategy. The findings of the study lead to a 
legislative initiative called the Talent and Innovation Initiative or TI². The TI² initiative 
was a group of legislation that sought to revamp the state’s economic development 
strategy. The programs that were created by the legislation focus on human capital 
development and fostering technological innovation. The legislation led to the following 
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new programs: Economic Gardening, Site and Building Development Fund, Internship 
Nebraska (InternNE), the Angel Investment and Tax Credit Program, and several 
programs under the Business Innovation Act such as microenterprise assistance and 
startup assistance. 
 While the TI² initiative shows a new focus for Nebraska, the initiative also 
demonstrates an existing trend in Nebraska politics where Nebraska’s rural areas are 
given priority. For instance, in the Economic Gardening legislation, the only eligible 
businesses are those in communities and/or counties with less than 50,000 residents. 
These provisions are not new to economic development legislation and policy in 
Nebraska. By including such provisions, the state hopes to level the playing field between 
rural and urban areas of the state. Nebraska is somewhat unique in this aspect. Most 
states with similar programs do not use locational requirements to allocate funds. The 
presence of the locational criteria possibly indicates the impact of spatial identity on 
policy making.  
 Policies in Nebraska show evidence of an urban/rural divide in state politics. This 
divide is nothing new and many states have similar phenomena. The divide can be 
attributed to differences in social and political culture going back to the beginning of the 
state. The difference in political culture between urban and rural geographic 
constituencies is important because it can influence how policy makers view economic 
policy. Each constituency based on its identity will have differing views on how to 
distribute tax money to encourage economic growth. These views are due to how each 
constituency views “the market place” and “economic rationality” as ordering principles 
for society (Elazar quoted in Boeckelman, 1991). Rural agricultural constituencies may 
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favor the elimination of estate and inheritance taxes, and they will view business 
incentives to urban manufactures suspiciously (Young, 2011). Furthermore, policy 
makers will prioritize the interests of constituency because of the absence of strong 
parties. They will rely on the constituents due to the need to be reelected. Due to these 
issues, one begs the question of whether political parties or the spatial identity of the 
geographic constituency, are more important when legislators are voting on economic 
development policy, in Nebraska. The exploration of voting behavior can provide a better 
sense of what is driving certain senators to choose certain policies. Basically, are their 
decisions colored by the social, cultural, and economic difference of being rural or urban 
or are their decisions partisan driven.  
  In my thesis, I analyze the impact of the shared rural spatial identity between 
constituency and rural legislators on roll call votes on economic development legislation 
for the 2011-2012 legislative session, in the Nebraska Unicameral. The study is important 
for a number of reasons. First, the study provides a greater understanding of the 
urban/rural spatial divide, which impacts the implementation of economic development 
policy in Nebraska. One-size fits all strategies and traditional economic development 
strategies will not work well everywhere in the state, and they may further deepen 
cleavages between urban and rural. Understanding the character of urban and rural areas 
will help ensure success when implementing policies and programs.  If these two areas 
are culturally, socially, and economically distinct, then planners should use tools such as 
cooperative planning in order to secure buy-in by communities and businesses.  
Second, by exploring the link between rural spatial identity and policy-making, 
economic developers, planners and policy-makers can have a better knowledge of the 
4 
 
factors that affect a state’s choice of strategy. Understanding the effects of spatial identity 
can have implications on why some economic development strategies work better than 
others, especially what types of industries that the state should focus on, and how human 
capital and the workforce can be developed.  
Last, the study addresses whether political parties are necessary for democracy at 
the state level. Without the presence of strong political parties for voters to identify with, 
to set policy agenda and to dictate policy response, it is possible that economic 
development policy may lack consistency and direction. Thus, the lack of a strong policy 
direction will limit the ability of the state to achieve its economic objectives. 
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Chapter 2 Review of the Relevant Literature 
 When voting on legislation specifically economic development legislation, do 
rural legislators act on behalf of their parties or their constituencies? I argue that rural 
legislators will act primarily on the interests of their constituencies. They will act on the 
interests of their constituencies because they share a distinct rural spatial identity. Smith 
(2002) originally used the term, rural spatial identity, to describe the distinct spatial 
identity of rural residents based on the cultural, functional and relational aspects of rural 
society. I intended to expand and further develop this concept.  
Factors Influencing Legislative Representation  
  
 According to Hannah Pitkin (1967), representation can fall into two main 
categories: direct and substantive.  Under direct representation, the legislator represents 
his or her constituency directly. For example, direct representation could be a female 
legislator representing her female constituents. Substantive representation is a where the 
legislator represents the aggregate interests of his or her constituents regardless of factors 
such as race/ethnicity or gender. Often times, legislators will act according to a mixture 
of both (Orey et al., 2006). 
 Many factors can influence the representation and decision-making of a legislator. 
Legislators may represent and make decisions based on party (Wright &Schaffner, 2002), 
ideology (Poole & Rosenthal, 1997), gender (Bratton & Haynie, 1999; Orey et al., 2006), 
race/ethnicity (Bratton & Haynie, 1999; Orey et al., 2006), interest groups (Nownes, 
1999), media (Herbst, 1998), constituency (Seligman et al., 1974; Smith, 2002) and even 
their own self-interests (Mayhew, 1974; Krehbiel, 1993). These factors which influence 
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representation will have major impacts on the legislator’s voting behavior. However, the 
main factor that I will investigate is constituency and its spatial identity. 
Constituents 
 
 Constituency is one of most influential factors influencing representation and 
decision-making. For instance Smith (2001 & 2002), finds that state legislator roll call 
votes are more likely to reflect constituency interests than party interests. Constituencies 
are multi-faceted and are rarely homogenous. While the constituency is made of the 
population of the legislator’s home district, it can also include other external actors 
(Fenno, 1978). Though, while a constituency can be made up of followers of different 
political parties, most members of the constituency such as the population of the home 
district share place in common. Thus, the constituency may share a common spatial 
identity such as being urban, suburban or rural.  In return, this identity shapes the 
representation and the decision-making of the legislator.  
 Furthermore, legislators need to reflect the interests of their constituents because 
they need to maintain or increase their share of the vote in the next election. For the 
purposes of my study, I will use Fenno’s (1978) definition of geographic constituency, 
which is the “the legally bound space” a legislator represents (p. 393). The geographic 
constituency is constituency at its most basic level. The constituency has a unique spatial 
identity which is made up of shared political culture, values, and attachment to place. For 
instance, the constituency can be agrarian vs. industrial, conservative vs. liberal, and 
urban vs. rural.
3
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The Urban-Rural Spatial Divide  
 Nebraska’s political history demonstrates a clear urban-rural divide. Scholars 
such as V.O. Key (1949), who studied the urban-rural divide in the South, find that the 
differences in rural and urban population leads to differing political perspectives. For 
instance, rural populations tend to vote against legislative term limits because term limits 
disadvantage rural areas which have smaller populations, therefore a smaller pool of 
eligible candidates, and they do not support some animal protection measures (Smith, 
2002). Other important issues that show a divide between urban and rural include 
eradication of estate and inheritance taxes. Rural legislators are against them because of 
their impact on family farms and ranches (Young, 2012). In Nebraska, rural senators of 
the Unicameral often question the distribution of economic development funds in the 
state. They argue that economic development funds especially those in the form of tax 
incentives tend to favor businesses in larger cities and the Lincoln-Omaha Metro area 
(Young, 2011).  
 The urban-rural divide is especially troubling considering that many rural areas 
have declining populations, which has affected the state and national policy environment. 
Jaher (1988) finds that rural interests despite some gains are losing ground in the national 
policy environment. First, the United States is becoming less rural. With fewer residents, 
rural districts as well as rural legislators are disappearing. Without representation, rural 
issues are not brought to the forefront in the federal policy making agenda. Furthermore, 
Jaher (1988) finds that rural congressmen behave differently than urban congressmen  
(p. 1079). When analyzing voting records, rural legislators are more conservative.  
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 Smith (2002) sees that rural populations and thus rural legislators have a “distinct 
spatial identity from urban populations” (p. 2). In his study, he analyzed public policy 
issues along an urban-rural spatial dimension. By doing so, one can see why some state 
legislatures pass counter-majoritarian legislation, such as overturning legislative term 
limits, which counter the outcomes of direct democracy through voter referendums and 
initiatives. To explain why these legislatures do this, he finds that rural legislators have a 
strong connection to their constituencies. The connection is strong enough for them to 
override the political will of voters throughout the state. This connection between rural 
legislators and their constituents is rooted in their shared rural spatial identity.  
 To understand why rural populations have a distinct spatial identity, he looks to 
rural sociology. In his review of the rural sociology literature, he finds three major areas 
of thought concerning rural identity. First, rural residents have distinct preferences based 
on the cultural patterns of rurality. Second, rural spatial identity is due to the functional 
aspect of rurality. Those living in rural areas have different ecological, sectoral or 
occupational roles than those in urban areas. Finally, he looks at the relational aspects of 
rurality. Rural societies due to the sparseness of population develop social networks over 
large distances. Neighbors who may be quite far apart must build strong networks with 
each other to overcome the challenges of living in sometimes isolated areas. When 
looking at these theories, he concluded that rural populations in the United States have a 
distinct spatial identity. 
 This distinct spatial identity informs the population. They choose representatives 
that represent them and their issues. In some cases, the legislator’s spatial identity may 
outweigh other factors when making decisions and introducing legislation. While several 
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scholars have analyzed the divide between urban and rural and its effect on overall policy 
at the state level (Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993), national level (Lewis-Beck, 1977) 
and on popular support for ballot measures (Smith, 2001 & 2002), few scholars have 
analyzed the divide’s effect on state economic development policy. When these authors 
analyze political culture, they ignore variations in political culture within the state. It is 
possible that urban and rural areas within the state differ greatly in this respect.  
Constituency, Political Cultural and State Economic Development 
 Since political culture is an aspect of spatial identity, it can inform a constituent’s 
and a legislator’s views on economic development. According to Hanson (1991), 
“cultural orientations toward development inform basic strategies for stimulating 
economic growth, rather than specific decisions about assisting particular industries or 
influential business concerns” (p. 64). Elazar (1970 & 1984), developed a widely used 
and critiqued typology of state political cultures. States could be identified as being 
moralistic, individualistic, traditionalistic or a combination of more than one. These 
political cultures each have different views of role of government in society. For 
example, moralistic political cultures view government as responsible for promoting the 
public good through citizen participation. In individualistic political cultures, policy 
reflects the interests of those who win political competition. Traditionalistic political 
cultures see that society is hierarchical which dampens political participation. Policies are 
enacted to maintain the existing status quo. These political cultures are based on the 
culture and norms of society within the state.  
Hanson (1991) looks at the relationship between political culture and economic 
development. By drawing upon Elazar’s political culture typologies, Hanson suggests 
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that moralistic, individualistic and traditionalistic political subcultures entail different 
economic development strategies.  For instance, he finds empirical evidence that 
moralistic states will seek strategies that will promote job creation for low-income 
individuals. Individualistic states will employ policies that confer particularistic benefits 
on investors such as tax incentives.  Furthermore, traditionalistic states prefer 
exclusionary incentives that tend to reinforce existing patterns of domination.  His article 
focuses on the macro rather than micro level of policy.  For example, Hanson looks at 
overall development strategy for the state rather than specific legislation or programs, and 
he doesn’t distinguish between political culture variations within a state. 
 Additionally, Boeckelman (1991) analyzes the impact of political culture on state 
development policy. Through regression analysis, Boeckelman (1991) found that 
traditionalistic states favor maintenance or attraction strategies because these strategies 
seek to build profitable alliances between businesses and politicians rather than long-term 
economic growth. While moralistic states favor job creation strategies, which focus on 
serving the common good and seek long-term gains. Also, he observes that policy 
diffusion or whether neighboring states have adopted similar policies is influential on 
policy-making.  
 Furthermore, Boeckelman (1991) argues that political culture is pertinent to 
economic development issues for two reasons. First, the concept of political culture is 
partly rooted in orientations toward the political economy.  It is rooted in the “historical 
opposition of two views of the American political system as being designed for 
individuals either to bargain over self-interests (a ‘marketplace’) or to cooperate to 
achieve shared goals rooted in moral principles (a ‘commonwealth’)” (Wirt, 1991, p. 4). 
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Second, political culture appears to reveal itself more readily in the behavior of political 
leaders than general public opinion. The reliance on political culture appears strongest 
when policies are complex such as an economic development policy and when public and 
private leaders play key roles (Boeckelman, 1991, p. 51). According to Boekelman 
(1991), political culture “seems to act as a filter” to the state’s economic development 
policy response (p. 59). 
 Like Hanson (1991), Boeckelman’s (1991) analysis is at the state policy level, and 
both authors use multivariate analysis. Both analyses leave unanswered questions. First, 
how does political culture of a constituency or even the broader encompassing notion of 
rural spatial identity, which accounts for place based differences in political culture, 
influence decisions on individual pieces of legislation? Second, how does all of this 
translate into policy and decision-making in Nebraska, the United States’ only one house 
state legislature? 
Overall, legislators will be influenced by the rural spatial identity which they 
share with their constituents especially when voting on economic development policy. 
According to Hanson (1991), “policies to promote growth raise fundamental questions 
about the aspirations of a society and the role of government in realizing the goals of its 
citizens. To the extent that policy makers are socialized into their state’s prevailing 
culture, they will view development in terms that are consistent with underlying values, 
and pursue an appropriate strategy” (p. 64). 
Rural versus Urban Interest Economic Development Legislation 
 One may think that due to the differences between rural and urban, that rural 
residents and policy-makers would have different economic development interests. It is 
12 
 
easy to assume that rural areas are more interested in policies focused on empowering 
agriculture. However, identifying distinct policy differences can be very difficult. There 
is not a lot of research that tackles rural or urban interest economic development policy. 
A common theme from literature is that rural residents prefer inside economic 
development strategies where they have greater control over the process.  
Inside economic development strategies tend to favor development in small rural 
communities. For instance, funding for start-ups and innovation are important in 
communities lacking a large manufacturing plant. With advances in technology 
specifically broadband internet, businesses can start-up virtually anywhere. New 
strategies also focus on human capital and talent development. Many businesses in rural 
areas are experiencing skilled worker shortages. While these strategies also benefit urban 
areas, the impact is greater in the rural areas were resources are more limited. Urban 
economic development policies tend to focus on business attraction and recruitment 
which can be considered outside economic development strategies. In addition, for rural 
residents and policy-makers, economic development and environmental protection are at 
odds, especially since many rural residents depend on natural resources whether in 
mining, farming, ranching, and even tourism  to earn their livings.  
For the purposes of this thesis, economic development legislation or legislation 
which consists of policies to promote job creation and quality of life will be seen through 
two lenses: rural interest and urban interest. Rural interest and progressive economic 
development legislation is legislation which promotes rural economic development 
interests such as inside economic development strategies. These strategies seek to 
promote the growth of small business and entrepreneurs and focus on training, education, 
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infrastructure and policies that promote the agricultural economy. Urban interest 
economic development legislation will be more along the lines of outside economic 
development strategies such as business recruitment. 
Why not Parties? 
 
 Since 1937, Nebraska has had a nonpartisan unicameral legislature.  The only 
house is the Senate, which consists of 49 Senators. Parties in the case of legislative 
behavior will be expected to be weak. This is due to the expected non-partisan nature of 
the Nebraska Unicameral legislature (Wright & Schaffner, 2002).
4
 However, recent 
research has shown that term limits, introduced in 2006, may be strengthening 
partisanship (Masket & Shor, 2011). From reviewing this literature, one could ask 
whether party or constituency has a greater impact on legislative behavior in Nebraska. 
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Chapter 3 Research Design and Methods 
Hypotheses 
 
 Based on prior research and understanding about political parties and spatial 
identity, I believe that I will find that rural spatial identity will have a stronger 
relationship than political party on voting for economic development and environmental 
legislation. An analysis of environmental legislation is included to add richness to my 
analysis. Since pro-environmental policy displays a strong national partisan cleavage 
(Dunlap, Xiao, & McCright, 2001), I found it useful to compare the voting behavior on 
economic development legislation to that of environmental legislation in Nebraska. By 
doing so, one can see how much different voting for economic development policy is 
from environmental policy. 
H(1) Spatial identity of the geographic constituency in Nebraska will have more impact 
on economic development legislation vote choice than political party due to the absence 
of strong political party ties. 
H(2) Spatial identity of the geographic constituency in Nebraska will have more impact 
on environmental legislation vote choice than political party due to the absence of strong 
political party ties. 
 More simply put, I expect rural spatial identity to have a greater effect than 
political party on voting behavior due to the nonpartisan and therefore unstructured 
nature of the Nebraska Unicameral. I expect the influence of rural spatial identity to 
appear stronger when voting on economic development and environmental legislation 
because rural legislators may break party lines due to their distinct views on these policy 
areas. For instance, rural republican senators may behave differently than urban 
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republican senators. Although the two are from the same party, spatial identity may color 
the lens through which each senator views the policy area. Rural senators may favor 
economic development policies that focus on providing equity financing to small 
business and workforce development strategies while urban senators may favor 
traditional business incentives. In the case of environmental policy, rural senators may 
not be “pro environmentalists” in the traditional sense. But, they will vote differently on 
environmental legislation than urban senators due to their rural spatial identity in which 
the environment and the economy are closely tied. I expect these relationships will 
support my hypotheses that rural spatial identity has a stronger relationship with voting 
behavior of rural senators than does political party. 
Theoretical Characterization 
  
Spatial Identity of Geographic 
Constituency (Rural/Urban) 
Political Party 
Legislative Behavior 
 (Roll Call Vote) 
Economic Development/ 
Environmental Policy 
Figure 3.1.Theoretical characterization of the relationships between political party, spatial 
identity and legislative behavior and their impact on economic development and 
environmental policy. 
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 Data and Methods 
 Data for the thesis was collected from the legislative bills and roll call voting 
records for the 2011-2012 legislative session of the Nebraska Unicameral. This session 
was chosen for a number of reasons. First, the session had just recently finished, so the 
legislation is timely and current. Second, the session produced a large number of 
economic development bills compared to previous legislative sessions. With the great 
number of economic development bills, it will be interesting to see how legislators 
approach different types of economic development policy.  
 Nebraska has only one house, which is the Senate, and 49 legislative districts, 
which elect one member. The legislative voting records, bill, and demographic data for 
each Senator came from Nebraska State Legislature website.
5
 Data concerning the 
demographics of each legislative district came from the United States Census.
6
 
Legislative bills were coded according to the substantive content of the bill, for instance, 
whether the bill was an economic development bill or not.  
Dependent Variable 
 
 There is one dependent variable. The dependent variable is Senator vote on 
economic development legislation/environmental legislation or (1=For, 0=Against). In 
the first part of my analysis, which looks at voting behavior on blocks of similar 
legislation, I use the overall passage rate for each category of legislation as the dependent 
variable. In other words, I calculated the percentage of senators voting in support for 
economic development legislation, environmental legislation and pro-environmental 
legislation. In the second part of my analysis, which employs logistic regression to 
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analyze the roll call votes of individual bills, I use each senator’s vote on economic 
development/environmental legislation. 
Independent Variables 
 
– Party (1=Republican, 0=Other) 
– Rural District (1=Rural, 0=Urban) 
– Race/Ethnicity of District Pop (Percent of population that is white, non-
Hispanic) 
– Race/Ethnicity of Senator (1=White/Non-Hispanic, 0=all others) 
– Committee Chairmanship (1=Yes, 0=No) 
– District Vote in ‘08 Presidential Election (Percent of district vote for 
McCain in 2008 General Election) 
– Gender (1=Male, 0=Female) 
 To measure rural spatial identity, I used the proxy measure of whether the district 
is rural or not. To measure, party, I assessed whether a senator is Republican, 
Independent, or Democrat. The independent and dependent variables were analyzed 
through a correlation analysis and then by using logistic regression analysis. Logistic 
regression was chosen due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. The 
basic logistic regression model is listed below:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Vote (For or Against ED Policy/Environmental Policy) = a + (-)b1(Party) 
+ (-)b2(Rural) + (-)b3(Race/Ethnicity of District) + (-)b4(Race/Ethnicity of Senator) 
+ (-)b5(Vote ’08 Pres. Election) + (-)b6(Committee Chairmanship) + (-)b7(Gender) 
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Chapter 4 Analysis  
During the 2011-2012 session, there were a total of 51 senators. For each roll call 
vote, a maximum of 49 senators voted. The fiftieth and fifty-first senators replaced two 
previous senators. Senator Dennis Utter (District 33) from Hastings, Nebraska passed 
away, and was replaced by Les Seiler. Another, Senator Dave Pankonin (District 2), 
resigned for personal reasons. He was replaced by Paul Lambert. In addition, several 
senators were absent for numerous votes due medical complications. For instance, 
Senator Wightman (District 36) was absent for a length of time due to illness. Other 
noticeable absences may be explained by schedule conflicts or political strategy.  Not 
voting on legislation was a way to take a neutral stance on controversial legislation. By 
not “voting against” a bill, the senator could vote against a bill without going on record as 
doing so. Future research on why some senators chose to abstain or chose to be absent 
during final reading votes would be interesting and useful. 
District Characteristics 
 
 The legislators represented 49 districts of which 16 were rural as defined by the 
United States Census and 33 were urban.
7
 The differences between urban and rural 
districts were quite noticeable. According to Table 4.1, urban districts were on average 
younger, more racially and ethnically diverse, and had higher proportions of college 
graduates. Rural districts had lower unemployment rates but also lower per capita 
incomes. Looking at Maps 4.1 and 4.2, which show the location of the 49 Nebraska 
legislative districts in 2000, the urban districts were clustered in the eastern one-third of 
the state in the Omaha and Lincoln metro areas while the rural districts made-up the 
western two-thirds of the state. Maps 4.3 and 4.4 show the districts by political party. 
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Map 4.1: Legislative Districts by Spatial Identity Statewide View 
 
Map 4.2: Legislative Districts by Spatial Identity Detail View 
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Map 4.3: Legislative Districts by Party: Statewide View 
 
 
Map 4.4: Legislative Districts by Party: Detail View 
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Table 4.1 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Nebraska Legislative Districts 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Rural Districts     
(N=16)     
Median Age 36.2 46.0 42.3 2.8 
Proportion H.S. Diploma (%) 32.9 42.3 36.5 2.9 
Proportion Some College (%) 20.9 25.5 23.3 1.5 
Proportion BA (%) 10.7 17.3 14.0 2.3 
Per Capita Income ($) $20,635 $26,613 $23,097 $2,132 
Per White (%) 84.9 99.4 95.8 4.5 
Unemployment Rate (%) 2.1 6.3 3.9 1.1 
PerMcCain08 (%) 58.6 81.0 69.8 6.9 
     
Urban Districts     
(N=33)     
Median Age 23.3 40.8 34.2 3.8 
Proportion H.S. Diploma (%) 16.1 37.9 27.13 6.5 
Proportion Some College (%) 17.7 28.3 23.9 2.7 
Proportion BA (%) 7.3 35.5 20.2 8.0 
Per Capita Income ($) $12,445 $40,149 $25,505 $6,808 
Per White (%) 25.2 97.5 86.9 13.8 
Unemployment Rate (%) 2.9 18.5 5.9 3.0 
PerMcCain08 (%) 7.6 73.2 53.1 14.6 
     
Total State     
(N=49)     
Median Age 23.3 46 36.9 5.2 
Proportion H.S. Diploma (%) 16.1 42.3 30.2 7.1 
Proportion Some College (%) 17.7 28.3 23.7 2.3 
Proportion BA (%) 7.3 35.5 18.2 7.3 
Per Capita Income ($) $12,445 $40,149 $24,719 $5,798 
Per White (%) 25.2 99.4 89.8 12.3 
Unemployment Rate (%)  2.1 18.5 5.3 2.7 
PerMcCain08 (%) 7.6 81.0 58.5 14.8 
 
 Also, rural districts were more likely to vote for McCain in the 2008 General 
Election. In some rural legislative districts, up to 70% of voters voted for McCain 
compared to only 53% of voters in urban districts.  The legislative district descriptive 
statistics, in Table 4.1, show that Nebraska’s urban and rural districts are quite different 
demographically, economically, and politically. The data support the literature 
concerning the composition of urban and rural places (Gimple & Karnes, 2006).  
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Legislative Characteristics 
 
 In the 2011-2012 legislative session, the 51 senators were predominately 
Republican, white, and male. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 provide an overview of the make-up of 
the Unicameral. In addition, most of the senators represented urban districts. Democrats, 
with 15 members, made up 29.4% of the total, Republicans, with 35 members, made up 
68.6% of the unicameral, and there was one Independent. Overall, 66.7% of senators 
were from urban districts and 33.3% were from rural districts. When looking at party and 
spatial identity, there was a greater share of rural Republicans versus rural Democrats. 
Rural Republicans held roughly 23.5% of seats compared to the 9.8% of seats held by 
rural Democrats. On the whole, the Republican Party was more heavily represented by 
rural senators than by urban senators. According to Map 4.1, the urban districts fall 
mainly within the Omaha and Lincoln metro areas and along the I-80 corridor.  
 
Table 4.2  
 
Political Party and Spatial Identity of the Senators in the 2011-2012 Legislative Session 
 
Senate Members Total % 
Rural Democrats 5     9.8 
Urban Democrats 10   19.6 
Rural Republicans 12   23.5 
Urban Republicans 23   45.1 
Urban Independent 1     2.0 
   
Grand Total 51 100.0 
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Table 4.3 
 
Gender and Race of the Senators in the 2011-2012 Legislative Session 
 
Senate Members Total % 
White Male Democrats 10   19.6 
White Female Democrats 3     5.9 
African American Female Democrats 2     3.9 
White Male Republicans 31   60.8 
White Female Republicans 4     7.8 
White Male Independent 1     2.0 
   
Grand Total 51 100.0 
 
Legislation 
 
 For the 2011-2012 legislative session, I identified 1,233 bills of which 525 made 
it to final reading. For this thesis, I only analyzed bills that made it to final reading. 
According to the rules of the Unicameral, a final reading bill is a bill that has made it 
through committee and floor debates and which has been advanced to final reading. If a 
bill passes final reading, then it can be signed into law or vetoed by the governor. The 
bills that fail to reach final reading are either indefinitely postponed or withdrawn. Below 
in a Table 4.4, the outcomes of the final reading bills are shown. About one third of the 
bills passed with an Emergency Clause (“E” Clause), which become law immediately 
upon being signed into law. 
Table 4.4 
Final Reading Bill Outcomes of the 2011-2012 Legislative Session 
 
 Outcome 
 Failed Passed (“E” Clause)8 Approved by Gov. Vetoed by Gov. Veto Override 
Number of Final 
Reading Bills (525) 
1 524 (151) 514 10 7 
 
 For my analysis, I considered all final reading bills regardless of their outcome. 
The bills I was most interested in were those that were primarily economic development 
or environmental bills. Bills were coded one (1) if they fell into one these categories. 
Bills were coded zero (0) if they were not economic development or environmental bills. 
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I defined economic development bills as those that involve specific economic 
development strategies or policies such as increasing the amount of tax credits available 
for data centers or enacting programs such as economic gardening. Also, economic 
development bills included those that were sponsored by or dealt with the Nebraska 
Department of Economic Development.  
 While there were many bills that were indirectly related to economic development 
such as bills that sought changes to city sales taxes or bills concerning education or 
transportation, only bills that were directly tied to economic development were 
considered. Environmental legislation was included because for rural residents, the 
economy and the environment are closely linked. In addition, by analyzing the voting 
patterns on environmental legislation, one might have a greater understanding of the 
impact of spatial identity on voting because rural legislators may view the environment 
differently than urban legislators.  
Overview of Economic Development and Environmental Legislation During the  
 
2011-2012 Unicameral 
 
 Overall, 34 economic development bills reached final reading. The content of 
these bills varied. For instance, a number of economic development bills dealt with new 
programs to be implemented by the Nebraska Department of Economic Development. 
These bills were supported by the department, political leaders, and the business 
community. The legislation was focused on moving Nebraska’s economic development 
strategy from traditional business attraction and recruitment to policies that sought to 
incorporate greater workforce and talent development. These bills included LB345, the 
Small Business Innovation Act, and LB386, the creation of Internship Nebraska.  These 
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might be considered to be more beneficial to rural economic development interests 
because of their focus on small businesses, entrepreneurship and talent retention. Despite 
some progressive changes in economic development strategy, the package of bills 
included traditional tax incentives for businesses. For example, LB1080 and LB1118 
sought tax credits for data centers. 
 Politically, most of the economic development bills were viewed favorably by 
politicians, businesses, and the public. However, some rural interest groups and political 
leaders raised concerns that these new programs would still disproportionately benefit 
urban areas despite the increased effort to adopt more rural friendly policies. From 
reading news reports and commentary, a clear Republican/Democrat or urban/rural 
division was not apparent. Of all of the economic development bills which entered final 
reading, all passed.  
 Environmental bills were more varied in their content and their support. 
Considering that the Keystone XL Pipeline controversy was playing in the background, 
environmental legislation during the session was a hot topic. The environmental bills 
tended to pit rural and urban and Republican and Democratic interests against each other 
in nuanced and unexpected ways. Overall, there were 49 environmental legislative bills, 
all were passed. Of the 49 environmental bills, 14 were pro-environmental bills.  
Patterns of Support for Economic Development and Environmental Legislation 
 
 To place the voting on economic development and environmental legislation into 
context, it is useful to understand the patterns of voting on all final reading legislation. In 
all, there were 525 roll call votes on final reading legislation. It should be noted that only 
one final reading bill out of the 525 failed to pass a roll call vote. When analyzing all of 
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the votes, Republicans were more likely to vote favorably on all of the bills. The 
Republican passage rate for all of the legislation was 95.21%. Democratic senators 
viewed the legislation on the whole less favorably. The passage rate for Democratic 
senator for all legislation was only 90.53%. The lone Independent voted for all legislation 
82% of the time. The average rate of passage for all senators regardless of political party 
was 91.88%. It makes sense that Republicans would vote more favorably than 
Democrats, since the Unicameral was composed mostly of Republicans and Republicans 
introduced legislation at a greater rate than Democrats. 
Impact of Party on Voting for Economic Development Legislation 
 First, I analyzed the impact of party on voting for economic development 
legislation. After analyzing this impact, I analyzed the impact of spatial identity or 
whether the senator is rural or urban on voting for economic development legislation. I 
wanted to see if party or spatial identity had a greater impact or if spatial identity has an 
intervening impact on party when voting for economic development legislation. 
 In the session, there were 34 final reading economic development bills.  In Table 
4.5, the votes for economic development legislation when disaggregated by party did not 
show much variation. Democrats voted for economic development bills at a rate of 
95.27% and Republicans at a rate of 96.33%. The lone independent was more 
conservative by only voting for economic development legislation 79% of the time. 
Overall, economic development legislation passed at a rate of 93.76%. Surprisingly, 
Democratic senators were only slightly less likely to support the legislation than 
Republican senators. I found this to be surprising because Democrats have been found to 
be less supportive of traditional economic development policies such as tax incentives. 
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While the rate of passage for economic development bills was fairly close for 
Democrats and Republicans with Republican senators only 1.06% more likely to pass 
economic development bills, the difference between the voting pattern between urban and 
rural senators was much larger as seen in Table 4.6. For instance, when voting for 
economic development legislation, the rate of passage for urban senators was 94.31% as 
compared to 87.53% for rural senators. This is a difference of almost 7%.  
 
This finding supports my hypothesis that urban and rural legislators have different 
views on economic development policies. This could be due to the urban/rural divide 
where rural senators view that economic development policy tends to favor urban areas 
Table 4.5 
 
Economic Development Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Partisanship (X) 
 
Party Identifications (X) Percent Votes for All ED Legislation (Y) 
  
Democrat 95.27% 
 (15) 
Independent 79.00% 
 (1) 
Republican 96.33% 
 (33) 
 
Overall Passage Rate (All Senators) 93.76% 
 (49) 
Note. Numbers of senators are in parentheses.  
Table 4.6 
 
Economic Development Passage Rate (Y) by Spatial Identity (X) 
 
Spatial Identity (X) Percent Votes for All ED Legislation (Y) 
  
Urban 94.31% 
 (33) 
Rural 87.53% 
 (16) 
 
Overall Passage Rate (All Senators) 93.76% 
 (49) 
Note.  Numbers of senators are in parentheses.  
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over rural ones. Or, that state economic development initiatives favor business 
recruitment and attraction in urban areas over strategies that favor rural communities such 
as talent and entrepreneurship. In Table 4.7, after controlling for spatial identity or 
whether the senator was urban or rural, urban Democrats passed economic development 
legislation 94.40% of the time which is comparable to the passage rate for urban 
Republicans which was 94.27%. Between rural Democratic and rural Republican 
senators, the difference is much clearer. Rural Democrats were more supportive of 
economic development legislation than rural Republicans.  
Table 4.7 
 
Economic Development Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Partisanship (X) controlling for 
Spatial Identity (Z) 
 
 Spatial Identity (Z) 
Party Identification (X) Urban Rural All Senators  
    
Democrat 94.40% 97.00% 95.27% 
 (10) (5) (15) 
Independent 79.00% 0.00% 79.00% 
 (1) (0) (1) 
Republican 94.27% 92.27% 96.33% 
 (22) (11) (33) 
 
All Senators 94.31% 87.53% 93.76% 
 (33) (16) (49) 
Note. Numbers of senators are in parentheses.   
 
The finding that rural Democrats were the most supportive of all of the groups is 
surprising and contrary to my hypotheses. I expected both rural Democrats and 
Republican senators to be less supportive of economic development legislation due to 
their unique spatial identity. 
 Next, I evaluated the voting patterns with a more rigorous statistical test to see if 
there were any other factors that could be impacting legislative behavior. Furthermore, I 
wanted to know how statistically significant the relationships were between party, spatial 
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identity, and support for economic development legislation. The variables that I included 
in the analysis were the political ideology of the senator’s home district as measured by 
the percent of voters voting for United States Senator John McCain, the Republican 
presidential candidate, in the 2008 General Election, whether the senator was a 
committee chair, the race/ethnicity of the senator, and the gender of the senator, and 
whether the senator was a rural Republican. 
 First, I analyzed the correlation between the three variables: party, which was 
coded one (1) for Republican and zero (0) for Democrat, rural spatial identity which was 
coded one (1) for a rural legislative district and zero (0) for an urban legislative district, 
and voting behavior on economic development legislation which is the percent rate of 
passage for economic development legislation. I performed the analysis of correlation 
using Statistica statistical software.  
According to Table 4.8, my first analysis of the correlation between political party 
and rate of passage for economic development legislation was negative and not 
statistically significant at the .10 level. The correlation was weak and not in the expected 
direction. I expected Republican senators to be more favorable of economic development 
legislation than Democratic senators. The relationship between spatial identity and voting 
for economic development legislation was also negative, very weak and not statistically 
significant. Although not significant, the relationship was in the expected direction. I 
expected rural senators to be less favorable of economic development legislation than 
urban senators.  
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Next, I analyzed the interaction between party and spatial identity on voting 
behavior. I coded rural Republicans as one (1) and all others as zero (0). Table 4.9 shows 
the relationship between the interaction variable (rural Republican) and voting behavior 
was negative and not statistically significant. The combined interaction between political 
party and spatial identity was slightly stronger than the relationship between spatial 
identity and legislative behavior alone.
9
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8 
 
Correlations: Roll Call Votes, Party, Spatial Identity 
 
 Republican Senator Rural District 
Percentage of votes For Economic Development 
Legislation 
-.213 -.117 
Republican Senator 1.000 .091 
Rural District .091 1.000 
Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01 
Table 4.9 
 
Correlations: Roll Call Votes, Party, Spatial Identity 
 
 Republican 
Senator 
Rural District Rural Republican 
Senator 
Percentage of votes For Economic 
Development Legislation 
-.213 -.117 -.198 
Republican Senator 1.000 .091 .375** 
Rural District .091 1.000 .784** 
Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01 
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Except for rural Democrats, rural Republicans were less favorable of economic 
development legislation than urban Republicans and urban Democrats. Party had a 
slightly stronger impact on voting behavior than spatial identity. When political party and 
spatial identity were combined the coefficient was slightly weaker. 
Table 4.10 shows other variables which may have some impact on voting 
behavior include political ideology of the home district, the race/ethnicity of the 
legislator, whether the senator is a committee chair, and gender.  When running the 
analysis, these variables were found to have very weak relationships with voting 
behavior. Furthermore, these relationships were not significant at the .05 or .10 levels.  
 
Environmental Legislation 
 
 The findings concerning the voting behavior of urban and rural Democrats and 
Republicans were very weak and not significant, but the findings shed some support for 
the hypothesis that spatial identity combined with party has an impact on voting on 
economic development legislation. But, does this finding holds true for environmental 
legislation. According to the literature, economic development and environmental policy 
is very closely linked for rural policy makers because the rural economy is tied with the 
Table 4.10 
 
Correlations Roll Call Votes, Party, Spatial Identity 
 
 Political ID 
of District 
(Percentage 
for McCain 
in 2008 
General 
Election) 
Percent  
of White 
Residents in 
District 
Committee 
chair 
Male Race/Ethnicity 
of Senator 
Percentage of votes For 
Economic Development 
Legislation 
-.095 -.078 -.0134 -.160 -.013 
Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01 
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environment.  At the party level, Republicans and Democrats have distinct views on 
environmental legislation, especially pro-environmental legislation. Republicans tend to 
favor fewer restrictions and regulations than Democrats. The difference between 
Republicans and Democrats on environmental legislation gets muddier when spatial 
identity is involved. For instance, the literature finds that rural residents may be more 
favorable to some types of environmental legislation especially legislation that protects 
farmland, that upholds water rights, and that limits restrictions on wild animal control. 
Rural residents can be pro-environment but in a different way than urban residents. Thus, 
rural Democrats would vote differently than urban Democrats, and the same would be 
true for rural and urban Republicans.  
 First, looking at party and voting behavior, in Table 4.11, Democrats were less 
likely to vote for environmental legislation than Republicans. 
Table 4.11 
 
Environmental Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Partisanship (X) 
 
Party Identifications (X) Percent Votes for Environmental Legislation (Y) 
  
Democrat 91.73% 
 (15) 
Independent 88.00% 
 (1) 
Republican 94.30% 
 (33) 
 
Overall Passage Rate (All Senators) 91.29% 
 (49) 
Note. Numbers of senators are in parentheses.  
 
The Republican passage rate was 94.30% compared to 91.73% for Democrats. The 
content of the environmental legislation may contribute to the lower level of support from 
Democrats.  For instance, while there was some pro-environmental legislation much of 
the legislation sought to decrease regulation of the environment. Some of the bills were 
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not necessarily anti-environmental but not necessarily pro-environmental in the 
traditional sense either. While dealing with the environment, the bills did not reflect the 
priorities of national pro-environmental groups such as Green Peace or the Sierra Club. 
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In Tables 4.12 and 4.13, rural senators were less supportive of environmental legislation 
than urban senators. 
Table 4.12 
 
Environmental Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Spatial Identity (X) 
 
Spatial Identity (X) Percent Votes for Environmental Legislation (Y) 
  
Urban 91.25% 
 (33) 
Rural 86.29% 
 (16) 
 
Overall Passage Rate (All Senators) 91.29% 
 (49) 
Note. Numbers of senators are in parentheses.  
 
Table 4.13 
 
Environmental Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Partisanship (X) controlling for Spatial Identity (Z) 
 
 Spatial Identity (Z) 
Party Identification (X) Urban Rural All Senators 
    
Democrat 90.60% 93.80% 91.73% 
 (10) (5) (15) 
Independent 88.00% 0.00% 88.00% 
 (1) (0) (1) 
Republican 91.5% 91.27% 94.30% 
 (22) (11) (33) 
 
All Senators 91.25% 86.29% 91.29% 
 (33) (16) (49) 
Note. Numbers of Senators are in parentheses.   
 
Pro-Environmental Legislation 
 
 Focusing only on traditionally pro-environmental legislation, then the pattern 
becomes much clearer. Fourteen of the 49 environmental bills were pro-environmental 
bills. Table 4.14 shows that the Democratic passage rate for pro-environmental 
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legislation was 85.27%. Republican support was much lower at 78.16%. Even though the 
Democrats were more favorable of pro-environmental legislation, they were not 
overwhelmingly so.  
Table 4.14 
 
Pro- Environmental Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Partisanship (X) 
 
Party Identifications (X) Percent Votes for Pro-Environmental Legislation (Y) 
  
Democrat 85.27% 
 (15) 
Independent 85.71% 
 (1) 
Republican 78.16% 
 (33) 
 
Overall Passage Rate (All Senators) 80.39% 
 (49) 
Note. Numbers of senators are in parentheses.  
 
Spatial identity or whether the senator was urban or rural did not seem to matter. The 
passage rates for both groups were very similar in Table 4.15. 
11
  
Table 4.15 
 
Pro- Environmental Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Spatial Identity (X) 
 
Spatial Identity (X) Percent Votes for Pro-Environmental Legislation (Y) 
  
Urban 80.46% 
 (33) 
Rural 80.25% 
 (16) 
 
Overall Passage Rate (All Senators) 80.39% 
 (49) 
Note. Numbers of senators are in parentheses.  
 
I expected that Democrats would be the most favorable of pro-environmental 
legislation than Republicans. In addition, I expected rural legislators to be less supportive 
of pro-environmental legislation than urban legislators. Furthermore, of all of the groups I 
expected urban Democrats to be the most supportive and rural Republicans to be the least 
supportive of traditional pro-environmental legislation. However, Table 4.16 shows that 
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while urban Democrats were supportive of pro-environmental legislation, rural 
Democrats were much more supportive. Urban and rural Republicans were the least 
supportive. This finding makes sense in that urban and rural residents view 
environmental protection in different ways.  
Table 4.16 
 
Pro- Environmental Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Partisanship (X) controlling for Spatial Identity (Z) 
 
 Spatial Identity (Z) 
Party Identification (X) Urban Rural All Senators 
    
Democrat 83.12% 90.00% 85.27% 
 (10) (5) (15) 
Independent 85.71% 0.00% 85.71% 
 (1) (0) (1) 
Republican 79.19% 76.19% 78.16% 
 (22) (11) (33) 
 
All Senators 80.46% 80.25% 80.39% 
 (33) (16) (49) 
Note. Numbers of senators are in parentheses.   
 
Overall, the rural Democrats were the most favorable of pro-environmental legislation 
while the rural Republicans were the least supportive.  
Correlation 
 
 I once again used a correlational analysis to analyze the relationship between 
voting, political party and spatial identity.  Table 4.17 shows that the correlation 
coefficient for voting for pro-environmental legislation and political party was weak and 
negative in direction. The coefficient is not statistically significant at the p<.10 level. The 
relationship was in the expected direction, since I expected that Republicans would be 
less likely to vote for pro-environmental legislation than Democrats. Though the 
correlation coefficient is weak, it is slightly stronger than the correlation between 
political party and voting for all environmental legislation bills, which may demonstrate 
some impact of the type of legislation on voting behavior. 
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 The correlation coefficient between voting for pro-environmental legislation and 
spatial identity was very weak, negative, and not statistically significant as shown in 
Table 4.17.  In the case of voting for pro-environmental legislation, political party had a 
stronger relationship with the decision to vote for pro-environmental legislation than  
spatial identity. 
 
Independently, political party had some impact on roll call voting in the 
Unicameral. When political party and spatial identity were combined, the relationship 
between the combined variable and voting for pro-environmental legislation was negative 
and weaker than for party alone but stronger than for spatial identity alone as shown in 
Table 4.18. The coefficient was not statistically significant at the p<.10 level.  This 
finding did not support my hypothesis of spatial identity having a greater impact on 
voting behavior than political party; however, it was interesting that spatial identity or 
being from a rural district may temper Republican partisanship on roll call voting on pro-
environmental legislation. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.17 
 
Pro-Environmental Roll Call Votes, Party, and Spatial Identity 
 
 Republican Senator Rural District 
Percentage of votes For Environmental 
Legislation 
-.164 -.074 
Percentage of votes For Pro-Environmental 
Legislation 
-.206 -.007 
Republican Senator 1.000 .091 
Rural District .091 1.000 
Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01 
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Next, I included some other independent variables in the analysis such as a 
political identification of the district, the racial/ethnic composition of the district, whether 
the senator was a committee chair, gender, and the race/ethnicity of the senator. In all, the 
correlation coefficients, in Table 4.19, were very weak. They ranged from -.034 to .167. 
Only one was statistically significant at the p<.05 level. 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 4.18 
 
Pro-Environmental Roll Call Votes, Party, and Spatial Identity Interaction Variable (Rural Republican 
Senator) 
 
 Republican 
Senator 
Rural District Rural Republican 
Senator 
Percentage of votes For 
Environmental Legislation 
-.164 -.074 -.156 
Percentage of votes For Pro-
Environmental Legislation 
-.206 -.007 -.154 
Republican Senator 1.000 .091 .375** 
Rural District .091 1.000 .784** 
Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01 
Table 4.19 
 
Correlations Roll Call Votes, and Other Independent Variables 
 
 Political ID 
of District 
(Percent 
Vote for 
McCain in 
2008 
General 
Election) 
Percent  
of White 
Residents in 
District 
Committee 
Chair 
Male Race/Ethnic
ity of 
Senator 
Percentage of votes For 
Environmental Legislation -.034 -.074** .080 -.132 .070 
Percentage of votes For 
Pro-Environmental 
Legislation 
.024 .099 .106 -.071 .167 
Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01 
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Logistic Regression 
 
Logistic regression was used because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent 
variable. For instance, each for vote was coded as one and each against vote was coded as 
zero. In addition, logistic regression was chosen because of the ease of interpreting 
results as odd ratios. I chose to analyze six economic development roll call votes and 
seven environmental roll call votes. These votes were chosen because of their saliency. 
To determine saliency, I reviewed news articles and interest group websites, to which 
bills were prominent.  
Economic Development Roll Call Votes 
First, I ran six logistic regression models of economic development roll call votes. 
Once again the dependent variable was a senator’s vote on the bill. The six bills that were 
included in the analysis were LB345 or the Business Innovation Act, LB386 or the 
Internship Nebraska Act, LB388 or the site and building development fund,  LB1053 or 
the act to create an independent Nebraska tourism agency, and LB1080 and LB1118 
which set up tax credits for data centers. Table 4.20 provides the title and voting results 
for these six bills.  
LB345, LB386, and LB1053 are economic development bills were more 
favorable to rural interests. These bills included programs that were different than 
traditional economic development programs. The Business Innovation Act (LB345) 
provided funding to a suite of programs that focused on encouraging entrepreneurship 
and the creation of small businesses through programs such as economic gardening and 
microenterprise assistance. Internship Nebraska (LB386) proposed to fund college 
internships in hopes that students would be hired and stay in the rural areas. LB1053 
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proposed to create an independent Nebraska Tourism Department. It was seen as 
favorable to rural interests since tourism is important to the rural economy. LB1080 and 
LB1118 were two traditional economic development bills and were seen as counter to 
rural interests since data centers were more likely to locate in urbanized areas. Table 20 
provides a brief overview of the six bills.   
Table 4.20 
Key Economic Development Roll Call Votes 
 
Bill Title Rural 
Interest 
For Against Not 
Voting 
LB345 Adopt the Small Business Innovation Act 
 
Yes 47 2 0 
LB386 Provide job training grants for interns 
 
Yes 43 0 6 
LB388 Adopt the Site and Building Development 
Act and change provisions relating to the 
Affordable Housing Trust Fund 
 
No 46 0 3 
LB1053 Create Nebraska Tourism Commission and 
transfer powers and duties from the Travel 
and Tourism Division of the Department of 
Economic Development 
 
Yes 47 
 
0 2 
LB1080 Provide a property tax exemption and a 
sales and use tax exemption relating to 
data centers 
 
No 44 2 3 
LB1118 Provide tax incentives for large data center 
projects 
 
No 48 0 1 
 
The independent variables included in the analysis were Republican senator 
(1=yes, 0=no), Rural senator (1=yes, 0=no), male senator (1=yes,0=no), white non-
Hispanic senator (1=yes, 0=no), committee chair (1=yes,0=no), the percentage of voters 
for McCain in 2008 in the district, and the percentage of whites in the district. The 
analysis generated some interesting findings; however, none of the findings were 
significant at the .05 or .10 level. A summary of the logistic regression analysis for the 
six roll call votes is below in Table 4.21. 
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Table 4.21 
Odds Ratios of Voting for Economic Development Legislation 
 
 LB345 
Odds Ratio 
p value 
LB386 
Odds Ratio 
 p value 
LB388 
Odds Ratio 
p value 
LB1053 
Odds Ratio 
 p value 
LB1080 
Odds Ratio 
p value 
LB1118 
Odds Ratio 
p value 
Republican Senator 
__ __ __ __ 
.535 
p=.699 
__ 
Rural Senator 
 
__ __ __ __ 
.332 
p=.542 
__ 
Rural Republican Senator 
__ __ __ __ 
5.009 
p=.412 
__ 
Male Senator 
__ 
.567 
p=.663 
__ __ __ __ 
White non-Hispanic Senator 
__ __ __ __ __ __ 
Committee Chair 
__ 
3.610 
p=.199 
__ 
3.156 
p=.378 
.598 
p=.580 
__ 
Percentage Vote for McCain 
in 2008 General Election .029 
p =.617 
204.557 
p=.292 
__ __ 
7.986 
p=.676 
 
24.172 
p=.685 
 
Percent White in District 
__ __ __ __ 
7.101 
p=.394 
__ 
Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01 
 
  The two independent variables that standout when looking at the odds ratios for 
each of the roll call votes in Table 4.21 are committee chairmanship and the percentage 
of votes for McCain in 2008 in the home district. Committee chairs were 3.6 times more 
likely to vote for LB386 and LB1053, and forty percent less likely to vote for LB1080. 
The percent of votes for McCain in 2008 was an important factor in four of the six roll 
call votes. For LB245 or the Business Innovation Act, senators from districts with heavy 
support for McCain in 2008 were 204 times more likely to vote for LB386. Those 
senators were about eight times more likely to vote for LB1080 and twenty-four times 
more likely to vote for LB1118.  
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Environmental Roll Call Votes 
 Concerning environmental legislation in Table 4.22, I examined seven roll call 
votes. The roll call votes examined were for the following: LB229, LB283, LB329, 
LB473, LB629, LB845, and LB1161. LB283 and LB629 were pro-environmental bills. 
LB629 and LB1161 dealt indirectly with the Keystone XL Pipeline. LB473 was a highly 
controversial anti-environmental bill that would allow farmers and ranchers greater 
control to deal with the wild prairie dog population. Another controversial bill with anti-
environmental tones was LB229 which sought to cut funding from the Nebraska 
Environmental Trust Fund.  Table 4.22 shows the title and voting outcomes of the seven 
roll call votes.   
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Table 4.22 
Key Environmental Roll Call Votes 
 
Bill Title Pro-
Environmental 
Rural 
Interest 
For Against Not 
Voting 
LB229 Change and eliminate 
provisions relating to the Water 
Resources Cash Fund and the 
Nebraska Environmental Trust 
Fund and provide an additional 
consideration for grants from 
the Nebraska Environmental 
Trust Fund 
 
No No 39 5 5 
LB283 Change provisions relating to 
property tax levy limits and 
provide school boards with tax 
levy and bond authority 
relating to energy efficiency 
projects 
 
Yes No 27 19 3 
LB329 Update the International 
Energy Conservation Code and 
change Nebraska Energy Code 
provisions 
 
Yes No 44 0 5 
LB473 Adopt the Black-Tailed Prairie 
Dog Management Act 
 
No Yes 32 11 6 
LB629 Adopt the Oil Pipeline 
Reclamation Act 
 
Yes Yes 47 0 2 
LB845 Provide reclamation 
requirements under the Oil 
Pipeline Reclamation Act 
 
Yes Yes 46 0 3 
LB1161 Change provisions relating to 
oil pipelines and provide for an 
evaluation of routes 
 
Yes Yes 44 5 0 
 
When analyzing the environmental roll call votes, in Table 4.23, the factors of 
party, gender, committee chairmanship, and home district party ideology appear 
prominent. Once again, caution must be used because none of the findings were 
significant at the .05 or .10 level. Republican senators were about seventy percent less 
likely to vote against LB329, about 3.6 time more likely to vote for LB473, and 9.3 times 
more likely to vote for LB1161. Male senators were about two times more likely to vote 
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for LB329, LB473, and LB1161. Committee chairs were 2.3 times more likely to vote for 
LB229, 2.7 times more likely to vote for LB473 and LB629, and 6.5 times more likely to 
vote for LB1161 They were less likely to vote for LB283 and LB329. Senators from 
districts that voted primarily for McCain in 2008 were 817 times more likely to vote for 
LB229, almost 490 times more likely to vote for LB629 and 20.5 times  more likely to 
vote for LB473. Interestingly, rural senators were about 8.8 times more likely to vote for 
LB1161, but when spatial identity and political party were combined, rural Republicans 
were about seventy-five percent less likely to vote for LB1161. 
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Table 4.23 
 
Odds Ratios of Voting for Environmental Legislation 
 
 LB229 
Odds 
Ratio 
p value 
LB283 
Odds 
Ratio 
p value 
LB329 
Odds 
Ratio 
p value 
LB473 
Odds 
Ratio 
p value 
LB629 
Odds 
Ratio 
p value 
LB845 
Odds 
Ratio 
p value 
LB1161 
Odds  
Ratio 
p value 
Republican Senator 
__ __ 
.339 
p=.598 
3.696 
p=.253 
__ __ 
9.353 
p=.162 
Rural Senator 
 
__ __ __ __ __ __ 
8.809 
p=.301 
Rural Republican Senator 
__ __ __ __ __ __ 
.235 
p=.518 
Male Senator 
__ __ 
2.350 
p=.423 
2.121 
p=.405 
__ __ 
1.734 
p=.636 
White non-Hispanic Senator 
__ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
Committee Chair 
2.343 
p=.333 
.343 
p=.212 
.270 
p=.423 
2.717 
p=.185 
2.612 
p=.529 
__ 
6.552 
p=.116 
Percentage Vote for McCain 
in 2008 General Election 
817.660 
p=.155 
__ __ 
20.545 
p=.453 
490.128 
p=.396 
.055 
p=.631 
__ 
Percent White in District 
__ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01 
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Chapter 5 Discussion and Conclusion  
 
Discussion 
 
While there is no statistically significant pattern to the voting behavior of the 
senators in the Unicameral, it appears that party rather than spatial identity is the more 
important factor when looking at roll call votes in blocks of related legislation. When 
looking at individual bills, the political identity of the home district and 
experience/leadership as measured by committee chairmanship becomes more important.  
 Senators are only loosely tied to their party and are weakly tied to their 
constituency. They reflect the interests of their constituents more through political 
identity rather than spatial identity. However, this relationship is very weak. The lack of 
consistent and clear voting patterns supports Welch (1978). In her chapter “The Impact of 
Party on Voting Behavior in the Nebraska Legislature,” she finds that the Nebraska 
unicameral has many coalitions with many only consisting of one member. She expected 
that if the unicameral were structured upon party lines than all Democrats would vote 
together and all Republicans would vote together. She finds that “neither party nor any 
other group serves as a potential organizing influence in the legislature; these findings 
indicate that in general, party has minimal influence on voting of legislators” (“The 
Impact of Party”, p. 106). My findings counter those of Masket & Shor (2011) who found 
evidence that the Nebraska unicameral was becoming more politically polarized. The 
unicameral might be becoming more politically polarized but not on economic 
development and environmental policy. 
I expected to find support for hypothesis that rural legislators would vote on 
behalf of constituency more so than party during roll call votes on economic development 
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legislation. They would choose to represent constituency because rural legislators share a 
unique rural spatial identity with their geographic constituency. My expectation was that 
senators would be direct representatives where the people of the district chose a senator 
whose social and economic background mirrored their own. Under this model of 
representation, the senator’s actions should reflect the interests of the constituents. 
However, I found greater evidence of trustee or substantive representation where the 
senator votes according to his or her own judgment rather than the opinions of the 
district. 
In Nebraska, I expect a shift in economic development policy is underway. With 
advances in technology, rural areas no longer have to depend on agribusiness. For 
example, with the advent of high speed internet, software developers are no longer tied to 
urban areas. The only limitation is the availability of broadband infrastructure. Rural 
areas can benefit from changing economic development strategy from traditional business 
attraction incentives to programs that foster innovation, entrepreneurship, and asset 
modernization.  
If it’s Not Party or Spatial Identity then what is Influencing Voting? 
 
In the absence of political party and spatial identity, legislators may be responding 
to their own personal interests or to interest groups. For instance, scholars have found that 
in the absence of party, recruitment of candidates is driven by self-interest and private 
interest groups. These interest groups may include chambers of commerce, banking and 
finance groups, and farmers’ interest groups among others. Furthermore, interest groups 
in a nonpartisan environment are heavily relied upon for their expertise (Kolasa, 1978).  
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 As found in Masket & Shor (2011), the governor may be exerting influence over 
roll call voting. Due to nonpartisanship, there is a weak leadership structure in the 
Unicameral. Leadership on the floor is limited to committee chairs and the speaker. 
Though, according to Johnson (1978), leadership in the Unicameral is more 
administrative and procedural rather than political. The Governor is really the only 
formal political leader. Masket & Shor (2011) found that with the advent of term limits, 
the influence of the governor as a policy initiator has grown considerably. 
Research Limitations and Potential for Future Study 
 
 The research faced several limitations.  For instance, due to the small sample size, 
there was not enough variation in the data. In the 2011-2012 session, there were 525 final 
reading bills of which only one failed to pass. In addition, most of the bills passed by 
more than 90 percent. An analysis of legislative behavior earlier in the legislative process 
would be more rewarding. For instance, Bothun et al. (1978) and Berens (2005) see that 
committees act as a de facto second house. It is in committees where most of the hard 
work of debating and refining the bill takes place. If the bill does not make it through 
committee, then it is either indefinitely postponed or defeated. A bill that emerges 
successfully from committee is likely to be automatically sent to final reading. Most final 
reading bills pass because they have already been vetted and agreed upon by all parties in 
the committee.  
 Comparing the legislative behavior of the 2011-2012 session with past sessions 
and other state legislatures, may help overcome some of the limitations of this study.  
One factor that was not included was term limits. Only studying the policy areas of 
economic development and the environment was another limitation. Other policy areas 
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such as education, appropriations, and health and human services may have shown a 
more politicized legislature. Future research should include a comparison of several 
policy areas. According to Bothun et al. (1978), the top committees are the ones that 
spend a lot. These ones are the most desired assignments. The top committees are 
Appropriations, Education, and Agriculture. For Nebraska legislators, these policy areas 
may be more divisive. 
 In addition, the results of this study question the definition of urban and rural. For 
instance, a senator from a rural district may not be from the rural part of the district. He 
or she may live in town and thus have a more urban spatial identity. Another possible 
classification is identifying senators as from metro and non-metro districts. A previous 
analysis conducted on behalf of this study attempted to classify senators in this manner; 
however, appropriately coding legislators according to metro and non-metro residency 
was problematic. The large size of the legislative districts which encompass several 
counties do not conform well to the U. S. Census defined metropolitan statistical areas.  
GIS software should be used for more in-depth spatial analysis of the composition of 
rural, urban, non-metro, and metro regions of legislative districts.  Furthermore, future 
study should look more closely at the occupations of the senators and where they live 
within their districts. Without doing so, it would be difficult to capture substantive 
representation. Plus, qualitative data gathered from interviews of the senators on their 
beliefs and views would make it easier to understand how senators represent their 
constituents. 
 
 
49 
 
Implications 
 
The findings of the study will have numerous implications, especially in the fields 
of Economic Development, and Community and Regional Planning.  
Economic Development Implications 
Nonpartisanship makes it difficult to change the status quo; however, term limits 
may speed the process up. Before term limits, there was a lack of turnover in the 
Unicameral. The nonpartisan nature of elections made it is easier for incumbents to be 
reelected due to greater voter familiarity. One positive that came from a lack of turnover 
was that senators tended to be more experienced. However, without any political parties 
to organize opposition of candidates and policies, senators were able to take more 
moderate positions. Lack of competition in elections also meant that there was a lack of 
diversity of political views among candidates. Thus, changing the direction of economic 
development policy in Nebraska may be very cumbersome. According to Bothun et al. 
(1978), the highly decentralized pattern of policy initiation makes it hard to break the 
status quo (p. 75). The impact of term limits which were enacted in 2000 may have made 
it possible for the Talent and Innovation legislation including the Business Innovation 
Act and Internship Nebraska to pass. Senators who were not favorable to the Nebraska 
Department of Economic Development were termed out in the elections prior to the 
beginning of the 2011-2012 session. Lack of flexibility and slow response to change may 
impair Nebraska’s ability to compete nationally and globally and tackle such problems as 
human capital retention. 
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Community and Regional Planning 
The nonpartisan nature of the unicameral could be problematic for the field of 
community and regional planning. Nonpartisan elections may impede the election of 
progressive candidates who may advocate for planning friendly policies.  For instance, 
“nonpartisan elections decrease the influence of Democrats in urban politics, and more 
significantly, foster conservative policies unresponsive to demands for social change or 
for the use of government to remedy social problems” (Comer & Johnson, 1978, p. 4). 
Adherence to the status quo would make it difficult for Nebraska to enact policies that 
promote smart growth and sustainability. The absence of party loyalties can be both a 
negative and a positive. For example, lack of party ties make building coalitions difficult 
and once built, hard to maintain. Unstable coalitions could lead to policy that is 
shortsighted and unclear. On the other hand, without having to adhere to a strict party 
platform, legislators may be freer to vote at will. Thus, this autonomy gives progressive 
legislation a greater chance in a conservative legislative body. 
Lack of clear rural or urban coalitions with in the Unicameral may lead to policy 
that does not adequately reflect the economic development interests of either group. Lack 
of a strong policy focus may lead to programs and planning efforts that are difficult to 
successfully implement. The literature on economic development planning finds that  
some policies work better in some areas of the state than in others. The difference in 
success can vary considerably between neighboring communities (Ramsay, 2013) For 
instance, political culture and spatial identity can help economic developers and planners 
understand why rural residents may be for or against certain types of development. Rural 
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residents may prefer projects that support small business ownership versus the location of 
large manufacturing plant. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, these findings may be useful for understating the impact of rural 
spatial identity on legislative behavior and policy-making in other states. Although 
Nebraska is unique because of its unicameral legislature, the impact of rural and urban 
divisions is not. In addition, the study adds to the literature by clarifying the impacts of 
constituency and political party on policy-making at the state level. Exploring the factors 
that affect decision-making shed light on why states chose certain economic development 
policies. The nonpartisan unicameral was supposed to give the people more power 
through better representation. My findings show that while the vision of Senator George 
Norris has remained true in the sense that the Nebraska Unicameral is largely 
nonpartisan, the lack of organization along party or geographic lines may have serious 
implications on progressive economic development and pro-environmental policy. Future 
research is needed to understand the true impact of an unstructured legislature in specific 
policy areas beyond economic development and the environment such as education and 
health and welfare. 
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Endnotes 
 
1
 Brain Drain or human capital flight is the “migration of people endowed with a high 
level of human capital” (Beine et al., 2001). See also: Carr, J. and M. Kefalas. 2009. Hollowing 
Out the Middle: The Rural Brain Drain and What it Means for America. Boston: Beacon. 
 
2
 The movement of individuals and businesses to locations which maximize profit and 
utility is a key aspect of Location Theory. Individuals and firms will act on their own self-interest.  
 
3
 According to Jaher (1988), “‘Urban’ districts have 50% or more of their population 
residing in central cities of metropolitan areas. ‘Suburban’ districts are those where half or more 
of the population resides outside central cities of metropolitan areas. A ‘mixed’ district cannot be 
clearly classified as urban or suburban. ‘Rural’ districts are those where half or more of the 
population resides outside metropolitan areas” (p. 1078).   
 
4 Due to the fact that Nebraska has a one house legislature, many studies remove 
Nebraska from their analyses.  
 
5
 http://uniweb.legislature.ne.gov/index.php 
 
6
 http://www.census.gov/ 
 
7 Rural areas are defined as areas with a population of less than 2,500. Areas of at least 
2,500 but less than 50,000 are classified as Urban Clusters. Areas of 50,000 or more are classified 
as Urbanized Areas according to the United States’ Census Bureau on 
http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/urban-rural.html. 
 
8 Emergency Clause (“E” Clause) is “a provision that allows a bill or a portion of a bill 
take effect immediately after the governor signs it or after the Legislature overrides the 
governor’s veto.” From http://uniweb.legislature.ne.gov/about/glossary.php 
 
 
 
 
 
